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Abstract
Enterprise networks constantly face new security challenges. Obtaining
complete network security is almost impossible, especially when usabil-
ity requirements are taken into account. Previous research have provided
ways to identify attack paths due to network vulnerabilities and misconfig-
uration, but few have addressed ways to correct them, especially when con-
sidering usability requirements. This thesis presents an approach based on
the learning algorithm Population Based Incremental Learning in order to
solve a constrained optimization problem with the intention of increasing
network security. Preliminary results show that this approach is effective,
scalable and reliable.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This is a master thesis written as a part of the masters programme Network
& System Administration at the University of Oslo in collaboration with
Oslo & Akershus University College of Applied Sciences. The purpose of
this thesis is to understand computer security as a combination of several
vulnerabilities in a network and how they are linked together. The result of
this study will be to suggest a solution in how to improve network security.
Having that said, network security should not be at the expense of usability
requirements such as requirements of availability of services and resources.
Network security is a complex task of having a balance between security
and usability where both ends must compromise in order to accomplish
such a balance.
In the past years, tools and techniques associated with targeted attacks
have become easier to obtain and utilize. Nation states, private companies
and criminal groups have demonstrated desire to use such tools to execute
high-profile attacks with the intention of destructive or information-
stealing purposes such as seeking development and research data, financial
information and intellectual property. A recent report (“Security Report
2015,” 2015) states that the number of targeted attacks have increased, but
the awareness of such attacks has not.
1.1 Network security
Networks, especially within enterprises, are growing in complexity and
size. Network security is a large topic that essentially addresses how to
secure a network infrastructure. The attention towards IT security has
increased dramatically in the past years and it has revealed a tremendous
amount of security breaches. Motivations behind such breaches are of
financial gain driven by groups or individuals, industrial or governmental
espionage, theft and damages, or just out of thrill. This is a result of
the expanding reach of the Internet and increased availability to services
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and information channels which businesses and organizations have moved
online.
Security personnel or system administrators are in a constant race to keep
up with new threats on a daily basis. There is a variety of tools and
techniques available to strengthen network security such as vulnerability
scanners and attack graphs. Other examples include firewalls, intrusion
detection and prevention systems, advanced malware detection, anti-virus
software, access control, log analysis systems and VPN-solutions. What
they are all intended to is to prevent or detect unwanted activities such as
malicious intrusions.
1.1.1 Malicious network intrusions
Malicious intrusions into computer networks are critical to enterprises
making protection crucial to ensure stability. It is normal to assume
that confidential and sensitive data is stored within the network of an
enterprise. Moreover, a network of functioning computers keeps it
running on a daily basis. A malicious intrusion can potentially paralyze
the enterprise’s activities, damage its products and economy, ruin its
reputation and destroy its credibility. In contrast to materialistic losses,
it is difficult to determine the total losses as a consequence of such an
intrusion.
Targeted attacks usually exploit multiple vulnerabilities in a so-called
multi-stage attack to elevate their privileges and access in a network,
hopefully evading security mechanisms. Intrusion detection systems
generate large amounts of alerts, and for a system administrator, it is easy
to overlook an ongoing multi-stage attack.
1.1.2 Securing a network
System administrators need to secure their network to keep their resources
safe from malicious activities. There are several steps towards securing a
large network, and one of the most crucial is to secure it against known
identifiable threats. Many enterprises spend effort into doing so and a
result of this would hopefully be to have more secure systems and thus
prevent a compromised network. A vulnerability analysis implies that
every vulnerability will be removed, but in practice, this is usually not the
case. Removing vulnerabilities is complicated through reduced availability
of patches and upgrades, cost, and demands regarding efficiency, usability
and uptime.
Being able to recognize system vulnerabilities is considered to improve the
awareness of the network security. Vulnerability scanners are tools which
can assist a system administrator in identifying vulnerabilities on a system
(Holm, Sommestad, Almroth, & Persson, 2011). However, these scanners
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can only identify vulnerabilities in isolation. Attack graph tools can
enhance the information from a vulnerability scan to give a more contextual
meaning in a graphical way. Vulnerability databases are also useful as they
provide enhanced information about every known vulnerability.
1.2 Thesis statement
Previous work have given solutions in how to identify network vulnerabil-
ities, but few have addressed how to correct them. Vulnerability scanning
of large networks result in massive amounts of data, which can be used to
generate a complex attack graphs, often unreadable for humans. One of the
intentions of the attack graph is to give a basis for future security decisions.
However, graphs which are not human-readable cannot provide efficient
and satisfactory basis for decisions. There are few available methods in
how to efficiently address all of the vulnerabilities available in a network
and use the information to improve network security in addition to tak-
ing usability and network requirements into account. This leads us to the
following question:
Q: How can we use attack graphs to efficiently secure a network while
maintaining usability?
1.3 Thesis objectives
As an attempt to answer the problem statement, the target of this thesis is
to find a way to organize the information from an attack graph in order to
systematically and efficiently find an improved and more secure solution
to an already vulnerable network. The solution should take usability and
other requirements into account. Using a suitable algorithm to calculate
such a solution is required to ensure efficiency and reliability.
1.4 Thesis outline
This thesis is organized into the following chapters.
Chapter 1. Introduction:
This chapter provides a general information on the topic, which leads into
what point I want to do in this thesis. This is outlined in the thesis statement
in this chapter.
Chapter 2. Background:
The background chapter introduces system vulnerabilities and vulnerabil-
ity scanners followed by a description of attack graphs and the existing
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attack graph tools. As the thesis will utilize the attack graphing tool MUL-
VAL, a more detailed elaboration on this tool is carried out. Furthermore,
network hardening is described and previous work related to the prob-
lem statement is outlined. Finally, an introduction to Learning Automata
is portrayed and a detailed description of the algorithm Population Based
Incremental Learning.
Chapter 3. Approach:
The chapter describes the solution and how it should be implemented.
Examples show what is expected of the solution. It also states the various
experiment environments.
Chapter 4. Results:
Results from the experiments are presented here.
Chapter 5. Analysis:
This chapter interprets the results and states whether the presented
solution is reliable.
Chapter 6. Discussion and conclusion:
Reviews what has been accomplished in this thesis, gives suggestions for
further work and issues which occurred during the project. Lastly, the
chapter links together the whole thesis, mostly focusing on the analysis
and discussion which are compared to the thesis statement.
Parts:
These chapters are structured in three parts. Part 1 consist of chapter 1 and
2, part 2 has chapter 3, and part 3 contains chapter 4 through 7.
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Chapter 2
Background
Computer systems play a critical role in most parts of our society.
Critical information and infrastructure such as financial data, power grids,
governmental and enterprise secrets and more are controlled by these
systems. Protecting these assets is crucial to our society. In order to
fully comprehend the context of this thesis, an introduction to different
technologies and expressions is needed.
2.1 System Vulnerabilities
Software vulnerabilities are usually found in most software available.
Intrusions are commonly performed by exploiting a system due to
vulnerabilities and misconfiguration in order to gain increased privileges.
System vulnerabilities are often discovered by scrutinizing a system,
normally performed by security professionals or hackers with malicious or
economic intentions. Some vulnerabilities are even discovered by chance.
Vulnerabilities are discovered in a tremendous variety of applications,
making even a medium sized network vulnerable on many levels. This
could potentially mean that one vulnerability gives privileges to exploit
another.
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Figure 2.1: Yearly discovered software flaws (CVE) since 1997 (NVD, 2015).
There are around 70000 Common Vulnerabilities & Exposures (CVE)
known to date according to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
(NVD, 2015). It is a daunting task to manually keep track on all existing
vulnerabilities and detect those available in a network. Fortunately, there
are tools available to automate these processes called network vulnerability
scanners. Examples include Nessus, OVAL, Core Impact and more. These
scanners are used to examine the architecture of a network and report
identified vulnerabilities. A typical network vulnerability assessment
is commonly divided into three parts: network scanning, vulnerability
scanning and vulnerability analysis (Holm et al., 2011).
Network scanning identifies which hosts are available in a network, what
operative systems they run and what type of services they are using.
The next step involves the actual vulnerability scanning. A database of
vulnerability signatures are compared to the information from the network
scanning to generate a set of vulnerabilities that are supposedly available in
the network. The next step is to verify the presence of the set of supposedly
available vulnerabilities by actively trying to exploit the systems. This is
often executed by sending specially crafted packages designed to exploit
the vulnerability in question. An example of such an exploit would be to
try exploiting a vulnerability in the Network Time Protocol (NTP) using
an attack called the NTP reflection attack. This attack is performed by
sending a crafted packet which requests a large amount of data from
the server by taking advantage of a flaw in older versions of NTP (ICS-
CERT, 2014). The flaw can be used to collect data of hosts connected to
the NTP server, but is also greatly considered to serve as a Distributed
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Denial of Service (DDoS) attack as a small query (the crafted packet) can
redirect large amounts of data. The scanning tool will know whether a
NTP server is vulnerable if it receives a reply with the queried data. From
a scanning tool’s point of view, it is essential that performing these active
tests does not disrupt the services. Lastly, a vulnerability analysis evaluates
the severity of all identified vulnerabilities. Most enterprises have a large
amount of vulnerabilities, and it is therefore important to identify which
vulnerabilities represent the highest security risks. Some vulnerabilities
are easy to exploit or constitute huge consequences. It is thus essential to
determine which vulnerabilities are most significant.
CVE Description
CVE-2010-0425 A module in the web service Apache called mod_isapi
can be forced to unload a library before a request has
completed. It can be performed by sending a specially
crafted request to the web server. The exploit can
result in memory corruption, allowing an attacker to
run arbitrary code on the server. This vulnerability is
restricted to Apache running on Windows
CVE-2013-0130 CoreFTP is vulnerable to buffer overflow when pars-
ing longer than usual directory names from a FTP
server. The commands LIST and VIEW can result in
denial of service meanwhile the commandDELE can
cause arbitrary code execution.
CVE-2014-0160 A vulnerability in OpenSSL cryptographic software li-
brary allows any attacker to retrieve memory data
which under normal conditions are protected by SS-
L/TLS encryption. This CVE is commonly known
as the Heartbleed bug and is exploited by sending a
crafted request to a server revealing usernames, pass-
word and other content located in the memory.
Table 2.1: Examples and descriptions of vulnerabilities (CERT/CC, 2015).
However, most vulnerability scanners can only evaluate one vulnerability
by itself and rank or score it accordingly. They are unable to see the entire
picture of all vulnerabilities as a whole.
Figure 2.2: Vulnerability scanning.
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Figure 2.2 shows that results from a vulnerability scan show what
vulnerabilities each host has. This means that security predictions are
limited to one single host at a time. In order to solve this problem,
attack graphs have been proposed. They rely on the information
from vulnerability scanners in order to provide enhanced vulnerability
management.
2.2 Attack Graphs
For protecting a network against attacks, there are numerous vulnerability
scanners, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) and Advanced Malware
Detection systems (AMD) such as Snort, Suricata, ISS, Tipping Point,
FireEye, ElJefe, Nmap, Nessus, OVAL and Cisco Security Scanner. These
solutions can be applied in real networks and can prevent future attacks.
The previously mentioned technologies have been developed to identify
threats and vulnerabilities and they have become extremely useful and
powerful. However, they do not verify that all conditions for a complete
attack are met, nor do they take into account that a set of multiple linked
attacks are potentially more harmful than individual ones. In order to
evaluate the security of a network of hosts, it is insufficient to consider
isolated vulnerabilities on each host, which only provides a partial picture
since sophisticated attackers perform advanced multi-stage attacks.
Phillips and Swiler (1998) propose an approach to graphically represent the
relations of vulnerabilities in a network. The concept is called attack graph.
An attack graph is a dedicated tool for network security risk assessment
as it is tedious to manually deduce security risk in medium-size to large
networks. It represents prior knowledge about network vulnerabilities,
their dependencies and network connectivity. They present their own
model which inputs network configuration and topology information,
attacker profiles and a database of attacks. Phillips and Swiler state in
their article that by assigning probability of success or cost as in the
level of effort for the attacker, one can use various algorithms to identify
paths with highest probability of success. This thesis is based upon this
statement.
Attack graph research particularly focus on three different goals (Lipp-
mann & Ingols, 2005). One of them is specifically directed towards net-
work security analysis. These attack graphs often take into account that
an attacker starts from a specific location in order to determine whether
the attacker can gain normally restricted privileges on one or several tar-
gets. Another goal is to present a formal language used to describe states
and actions by defining the needed preconditions necessary for an attack
to take place and the post-conditions which represent the changes in a net-
work state after a successful attack. A third approach focuses on how attack
graphs can be used to organize large numbers of IDS alerts. If an IDS alert
can be associated with an action in the graph, alerts can be grouped into
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known stages for an attack path identified by the attack graph. This is use-
ful for detecting the exact stages an attacker is performing in a successful
attack. A mechanism for matching IDS alerts to stages in an attack path is
required in this approach.
A typical procedure when analyzing network security is described in
Figure 2.3 (Sheyner & Wing, 2004).
Figure 2.3: Network vulnerability analysis.
Initially, scanning tools determine available vulnerabilities on each host.
Other network information, such as availability through connectivity
between hosts, is used to produce an attack graph. An attack graph can
show relations between existing configurations, exploits and undesired
privileges between all hosts in a network. Figure 2.4 is an example of such
a relation, limited to one exploit on one host. This example has PRE and
POST conditions. The configuration-entities represent the preconditions,
meanwhile the privilege-entity represents the postcondition.
Figure 2.4: Example of simple attack graph showing relations between
configurations, exploit and privilege.
One important aspect when it comes to attack graphs is that an exploit
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can only be realized when all of its required conditions are satisfied. In
Figure 2.4, the configuration entities (Configuration 1 and 2) represent the
exploit conditions in the given example. We call these AND-conditions. A
condition, however, can be satisfied if any of the realized exploits implies
the condition. We call these OR-conditions. In Figure 2.5, only one exploit
have to be realized in order for the privilege condition to be true. We say
that the require relation is conjunctive, meanwhile the imply relation is
disjunctive.
Figure 2.5: Example of simple attack graph showing relations between
configurations, exploit and privilege.
Multi-stage attacks take place when an attacker can elevate his privileges
multiple times by having the opportunity to exploit another vulnerability
from the previously increased privilege. Figure 2.6 exemplifies this.
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Figure 2.6: Example of simple attack graph showing relations between
configurations, exploit and privilege.
In this example, an attacker can continue the attack into the network with
his increased privileges he gained from exploiting Exploit 1. The objective
for a multi-stage attack would be to:
1. Gain specific privileges to an unique host in the network.
2. Gain general privileges to multiple hosts in the network.
Any of the two outcomes are highly unwanted. Having that in mind, an
attack graph can help answering the following questions:
• "What vulnerabilities exist on my systems?"
• "In how many ways can an attacker reach his goal?"
• "What actions can be taken or prevented to ensure the attacker does
not achieve his goal?"
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Figure 2.7: A typical network topology.
Figure 2.7 illustrates a simple network topology. An attacker coming from
the Internet would initiate an attack by exploiting available nodes in the
demilitarized zone (DMZ). A multi-stage attack does not stop there. Such
an attack continues using the increased privileges on a node which has been
exploited in the initial attack to exploit more nodes, preferably in a secured
subnet, where the most important resources are located.
2.2.1 Tools for generating attack graphs
There are multiple attack graph tools available. Here some of them are
listed:
• Topological Analysis of Network Attack Vulnerability (TVA) (Jajodia,
Noel, & O’Berry, 2005) was developed at the George Mason Univer-
sity and is an example of such an attack graph tool. The idea is to use
an exploit dependency graph to show pre and post conditions for all
exploits. It relies on input information from Nessus scans. A graph
search algorithm is used to chain the vulnerabilities in order find and
represent different attack paths which include multiple vulnerabili-
ties.
• Cauldron (O’Hare, Noel, & Prole, 2008) is a commercial version of
TVA. The tool works in three steps: firstly import all information
in a targeted network. Secondly, associate the information with the
known vulnerabilities. Lastly, provide a modelling environment for
analysis. Cauldron works with the vulnerability scanners Nessus,
14
FoundScan, Symantec Discovery and Retina. Initially, the tool did
not scale well as the algorithm in the worst case was O(n4) or O(n6)
where n is the number of hosts in the network (Yi et al., 2013). This
has however been improved with O(n2) as the worst case.
• Network Security Planning Architecture (NetSPA) was developed
by Ingols and Lippmann (2006) in Lincoln Laboratory of MIT. The
intention is to model adversaries and measure the effect of simple
counter measures. It uses firewall rules and results from vulnerability
scans to create a network model which is utilized to compute network
reachability and the attack graph. The risk is assessed by measuring
the total assets that can be controlled by an attacker. It is therefore
useful for identifying the most valuable attack paths in a network and
propose suggestions in how to repair the most serious weaknesses
quickly.
• Multi-host, multi-stage Vulnerability Analysis (MulVAL), an open
source project developed by Ou in collaboration with Govindavajhala
and Appel (2005) at Princeton University. MulVAL uses information
from vulnerability databases, configuration information from each
node as well as other relevant information to graph the pre and
post conditions from each exploit and how they interact with each
other in a network. Additionally, the tool makes available textual
formats of attack paths. The reasoning engine also scales well (O(n2))
with network size. It works with Nessus and OVAL vulnerability
scanners. The tool works command-line user interface.
• Attack Graph Toolkit is an open source developed by Oleg Sheyner at
Carnegie Mellon University (2004). The tool is based on Linux oper-
ating system platform and has a graphical interface. It scales poorly
with the complexity of the network as it increases exponentially with
the number of nodes. The project also seems abandoned as it has not
been updated since 2007.
Other examples of attack graph tools include FireMon and SkyBox View.
Based on previous research (Yi et al., 2013), MulVAL has an advantage over
most attack graph tools, especially when considering availability since it is
open source. In the previously mentioned attack graph tools, only MulVAL
and Attack Graph Toolkit are open sources. MulVAL makes available
resources for further security risk analysis, has a more active community
and scales better with the complexity of a network. Considering these
factors, MulVAL is the most suitable attack graph tool for this thesis. The
next section will elaborate more on this tool.
2.3 MulVAL
MulVAL produces a logical attack graph using the logic Datalog program-
ming language to disclose whether the network has possible threats. More
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importantly, it shows in what different ways in which a network can be
exploited to gain increased privileges. It creates its graphs based on con-
figurations such as network policies and vulnerability data gathered from
scanners as Nessus or OVAL along with vulnerability data from National
Vulnerability Database. MulVAL uses logical reasoning to identify possible
policy violations through information from the mentioned sources.
Figure 2.8: MulVAL framework.
Figure 2.8 illustrates the MulVAL attack graph framework in five parts.
The logic execution engine collects information about the network such
as interaction rules, security policy and analysis database. Given these
configurations, MulVAL can simulate the behaviour of an attacker in the
network. The logic engine generates graphic and textual format of possible
violations and attack paths.
According to the developers of MulVAL (Ou et al., 2005), a vulnerabil-
ity analysis tool must satisfy two features in order to be useful in prac-
tice:
• Be able to integrate formal vulnerability specifications from bug-
reporting community.
• Be able to scale with increased network complexity.
MulVAL does satisfy these features as it enriches vulnerability information
using the National Vulnerability Database and can generate attack graph
in seconds even with a network of thousands of nodes (running time O(n2)
with n being the number of nodes).
Initial network configurations (i.e. available machines, active services,
inter-host reachability etc.) in addition to a database of known vulnera-
bilities make MulVAL able to identify all potential attack paths an attacker
can exploit in a network. These paths are united in a logical attack graph
proving how successful a potential attack can be based on initial attacks
towards for instance the outer edges of the network as the DMZ.
2.3.1 Representation
As illustrated in Figure 2.2, a vulnerability scanner such as OVAL or Nessus
can detect a vulnerability such as CVE-2010-0425 (Table 2.1) locatad on
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a webserver. However, it cannot associate the effect of the vulnerability
such as what are the consequences and how can it be exploited. A
vulnerability database (NVD) developed by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) provides information that enrich the
data about identified vulnerabilities. MulVAL converts the information
into Datalog clauses such as:
1 vulProperty(’CVE-2010-0425’, remoteExploit,
2 privEscalation).
The vulnerability enables an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the
webserver. Extracted information about a host collected from a scanner,
such as a webserver, is converted into Datalog entries in the following
way:
1 networkServiceInfo(webServer, httpd,
2 TCP, 80, apache).
The collected properties about the webserver states that it is running a httpd
daemon, uses TCP and listening on port 80, the user is named apache and
represents the user privilege the daemon has on the machine. Network
configurations are in MulVAL interpreted as abstract host-access control
lists (HACL). It specifies all allowed accesses between machines in the
network and are normally controlled by packet control mechanisms such
as routers, switches and firewalls. The following example shows how
Datalog stores network configurations where the webserver is available for
connection from the internet using TCP port 80:
1 hacl(internet, webServer, TCP, 80).
Other entries include principal bindings such as hasAccount, binding prin-
cipal user information such as administrator access to network hosts:
1 hasAccount(sysAdmin, Host1, root).
Furthermore, policy declarations can describe which principal are allowed
access what data. If a policy is not declared as allowed, it is regarded as
probibited:
1 allow(sysAdmin, write, webPages).
There are numerous additional entries MulVAL reads from Datalog. The
following list describes some of them:
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Entry Description
clientProgram Describes the privilege of a client program when it is
executed and on what machine
setuidProgram Defines a setuid executable on the system and its
owner
nfsPath Specifies the owner of a particular path in the file
system
vulExist Defines what vulnerability is available on a specific
machine and what program can be exploited.
execCode Possible outcome of an attack. An attacker might gain
privilege to execute code on a given machine with the
privilege of a specified user.
Table 2.2: Examples and descriptions of MulVAL Datalog entries (Ou,
Govindavajhala, & Appel, 2005).
The information MulVAL processes can be organized into three different
entities shown in an attack graph: configuration entities, exploit entities and
privilege entities.
• System configurations are represented as rectangular shapes. These
include host access permissions, existing vulnerabilities, applications,
etc.
• Privileges are represented as diamond-shapes. A privilege is what an
attacker can gain through exploits.
• Exploits are represented as elliptical shapes. A potential exploit links
the pre-conditional configuration entities, which enables the exploit,
with the effect of the attack, the post-conditional privileges (Homer
& Ou, 2009).
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Figure 2.9: MulVAL attack graph.
Arcs coming out from an exploit entity form logical AND relations,
meaning all of the child relations must be true in order for the exploit can
be used. Removing only one of the child relations would be sufficient for
the exploit to be unavailable. In the MulVAL attack graph in figure 2.9, we
can express the exploits in the following boolean formulas:
e1 = c1 ∧ c2
e2 = p1 ∧ c3
e3 = c4 ∧ c5
Arcs from privilege entities like p1 and p2 form logical OR relations. This
indicates that only one of its child relations need to be true in order for a
privilege to be achieved. Either e2 or e3 is required for obtaining privilege
p2.
e1 = e2 ∨ e3
2.4 Network Hardening
In security communities, network hardening has often been considered as
an art rather than science (Wang, Albanese, & Jajodia, 2014). Experienced
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security analysts do tedious work to identify and prioritize different
vulnerabilities and network weaknesses for fixing and patching. To
make network hardening more like science, rather than art, systematic
approaches to automatically compute potential hardening solutions are
essential.
Network and system administrators often don’t care about attack se-
quences, but rather determine best way to harden their network. A
straightforward set of network hardening options which can provide a se-
curity guarantee for a given resource is needed. However, a guarantee for
security might not always be an option. Fully hardening a network may re-
quire such a high cost that it outweighs the security risk. Shutting down the
entire network will fully harden the network, but the the cost exceeds the
security risk. Previous research have dealt with network hardening and
some approaches have inspired this thesis, especially network hardening
with respect to initial network conditions.
Attack paths can help network and system administrators with network
hardening, and in order to increase security, all attack paths must be
accounted for. Tools based on attack graphs can reveal multi-stage attack
opportunities in a seemingly well protected network by enumerating all
possible attack paths. To optimize this process, a representation that takes
all possible attack paths into account, but does not necessarily enumerate
all of them is needed. For instance, it is sufficient to know that a particular
exploit is required for all possible paths, without necessarily generating all
of them. The initial network configurations are the conditions to consider
when hardening the network, more explicitly the exploit preconditions in
a network.
2.4.1 Related work
For network hardening, we need to measure the overall security of a
network. Previous research (Wang, Singhal, & Jajodia, 2007) states that
a crucial part in measuring network security lies in understanding the
interplay between network components such as how vulnerabilities can be
combined by attackers in an advancing multi-stage attack. The framework
in this study focuses on computing overall security with respect to critical
resources. Two dependency models are presented, one captured by attack
graphs, and another captured by additional functions. The latter affects the
measure of network components but does not enables it to be reachable.
Another approach measures the security strength of a network in terms
of using the weakest attacker model, that is the weakest adversary who can
successfully penetrate the network (Pamula, Jajodia, Ammann, & Swarup,
2006). Other works measure how likely a software is vulnerable to attacks
using a metrics which is called attack surface (Howard, Pincus, & Wing,
2005) (Manadhata, Wing, Flynn, & McQueen, 2006). That is a security
metric for comparing the relative security of similar software systems
where the attack surface is an indicator of the software’s security.
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Network hardening with respect to initial conditions level was introduced
in 2003 (Noel, Jajodia, O’Berry, & Jacobs, 2003). The article states that an
approach using configuration elements is beneficial compared to exploit-
level approaches as it resolves hardening irrelevancies and redundancies
better. The conducted research was to find a set of initial conditions that can
disable a goal condition with a minimum cost. The authors represent the
resources in a network as logical propositions of initial conditions where
vulnerabilities are viewed as Boolean variables. A false condition would
mean the condition is suggested disabled for hardening. The presented
product does not scale well as the number of terms in the equation can
grow exponentially in the number of conditions in the network.
Another minimization analysis approach has been proposed by Homer and
Ou (2009). They introduce a methodology where security requirements can
be interpreted as a Boolean formula. The research presented by Homer and
Ou propose two SAT solving techniques, namely MinCostSAT and UNSAT
Core Elimination. The
• MinCostSAT: Minimizes cost by utilizing user-provided discrete cost
values to find mitigation solution.
• UNSAT Core Elimination reduces complexity in reconfiguration to
simple choices between conflicting requirements. Previous policy
decisions of the human user are placed in a partial-ordering lattice
in order to further reduce the choices.
This approach reduces complex problems to manageable proportions in
addition to requiring minimal user interaction in order to rapidly fix
misconfigurations which can lead to multi-stage attacks. The human
interaction includes making decisions about relative value of specific
instances of security and usability making the research able to account for
both security and usability requirements. Results prove that this approach
is scalable and effective.
Research conducted by Noel et al. (2003) introduces a framework
for computing the minimum-cost solution with guaranteeing the safety
for given critical resources. Also here, minimization is done at the
level of initial conditions. The proposed solution extends a graph-
based representation of exploit dependencies. The representation in
the study has low-order polynomial complexity in contrast exponential
complexity which have been found in most found works according to the
authors.
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2.5 Learning Automata and Population-Based Incre-
mental Learning
2.5.1 Learning Automata
Learning Automata (LA) is a self-adapting machine and was initially in-
troduced by Narendra and Thathachar (1974). The goal of this mechanism
is to "determine the optimal action out of a set of allowable actions, where
the optimal action is defined as the action that maximizes the probability of
being rewarded" (Oommen & Agache, 1999). Learning is defined as a per-
manent change in behaviour based upon previous experience. A learning
system is therefore characterized by its ability to consistently improve its
behaviour with the goal to reveal an ultimate solution.
Learning Automata is often used in systems where the knowledge about
the environment they work in is limited. An environment could be
unpredictable because it is changing over time. This is in academic or
professional fields called a stochastic environment. Stochastic Learning
Automata is used to increase the probability that an action will succeed in
such an environment. The LA mechanism uses stochastic optimization to
learn about the environment. A random generated action is selected based
on a probability vector, after which the probability actions are changed
based upon how the environment is responding, then the operations are
repeated. The automaton uses the response and previous knowledge from
past iterations to determine the next action. Over time, LA learns to choose
the right action, adapting with the environment(Agache & Oommen,
2002).
LA is provides problem solving which is applicable in numerous fields,
including networking and communications where problems such as
distributed scheduling (Seredyn´ski, 1998), neural network adaptation
(Meybodi & Beigy, 2002) and intelligent vehicle control (Unsal, Kachroo,
& Bay, 1997) have been solved using this mechanism.
A LA is defined by a quintuple 〈A, B, Q, F(., .), G(.)〉 (Narendra &
Thathachar, 2012), all of which are described in Table 2.3:
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A = {α1, α2, . . . , αr} The set of outputs/actions the LA has to choose
from. α(t) is an action chosen for any instant t.
B = {β1, β2, . . . , βm} The set of input to the automaton where β(t) is
the input of any instant t. β can be either infinite
or finite, but is commonly B = {0, 1}where β = 1
represents a penalty, meanwhile β = 0 represents
a reward.
Q = {q1, q2, . . . , qs} the set of finite states, where Q(t) denotes the
state of the automaton at any instant t.
F(., .) : Q× B 7→ Q A mapping function, called the transition func-
tion, that maps the current state and input to the
next state at the instant t, such that, q(t + 1) =
F[q(t), β(t)]. It determines the state of the au-
tomaton at any subsequent time instant t + 1.
G(.) is a mapping G : Q 7→ A. It is called the output
function, it maps a current state into the current
output. G determines the action taken by the
automaton if it is in a given state as: α(t) =
G[q(t)].
Table 2.3: Quintuple, Learning Automata
Figure 2.10: Learning automaton.
The learning process is based on repeating iterations where LA contin-
uously interacts with an environment and processes responses to its ac-
tions. After trying numerous actions, LA learns the most optimal action.
While running, the automaton suggests a set of actions, but is constrained
to choose only one of them. When the action is chosen, the environment
responses β(t) at time t to this chosen action. The action is either rewarded
or given a penalty. Based on β(t), the state of the automaton is updated,
continued by selecting a new action at (t + 1).
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2.5.2 Population-Based Incremental Learning
Population-based incremental learning (PBIL) is a generalisation of Learn-
ing Automata and is a probabilistic model commonly used for optimiza-
tion of large dynamic combinatorial search problems. It is a combination of
evolutionary optimization (Fogel, 1994) and hill climbing (Gent & Walsh,
1993) according to Baluja (1994). The method incorporates genetic algo-
rithms (GA) and competitive learning for function optimization, but rather
than being based on population-genetics, PBIL is similar to learning au-
tomata in which the automata chooses actions independently. The com-
bination of these two methods constitute a tool much simpler than a GA
and outperforms GA on many optimization problems. The intention of the
algorithm is to generate a real valued probability vector which, when sam-
pled, reveals high evaluation solution vectors with high probability (Baluja
& Caruana, 1995).
The features of PBIL are as follows (Folly, 2005):
1. PBIL has no crossover and fitness proportional operators.
2. It works with probability vectors, normally from 0-1, which control
the random bitstring generated by the algorithm and used to produce
others through learning.
3. All solutions in the population are not stored, only the currently best
solution and the one being evaluated.
Evolutionary Algorithms (EA), which utilize the principles of natural
selection and population genetics (e.g. GAs), have become common for
optimization and search techniques due to their powerful capabilities for
finding solutions to difficult problems. Especially in static environments,
where the landscape does not change during computation (Golberg, 1989).
However, real-world environments are often prone to changes, making
traditional EAs unsuitable as they cannot adapt properly to changed
environments once converged (Yang & Yao, 2005). In contrast, PBIL has
shown itself to be very successful when compared to different standard
genetic and hill climbing algorithms on various benchmarking (Baluja
& Davies, 1997) and real-world (Greene, 1996) problems. Moreover,
theoretical work on this method’s convergence behaviour has been carried
out (Lozano, 2000)(Hiihfeld & Rudolph, 1997).
For each iteration, a set of samples are generated according to the current
probability vector. The set of samples are evaluated respectively to the
problem-specific function. In the end, the probability vector is learnt and
shifted towards a solution with the best result. The distance the probability
vector is pushed each iteration depends on a parameter called the learning
rate (LR) which weights the previous vector with the new vector. The
learning rate is commonly set to be 0.05. For the next iteration, when
the probability vector is updated, a new set of solutions are generated
according the the updated probability vector. The algorithm ends when
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the termination conditions are satisfied, usually when all vectors have
converged (normally towards 0 or 1) or the number of iterations have
reached a maximum number.
As an example, the solution to a problem can be represented as a string
of 1’s and 0’s. The initial values of a probability vector is normally 0.5
and a satisfactory final probability vector should be 0.99, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01,
0.99, 0.99. Sampling from such an initial vector reveals random solution
vectors since there is an equal probability of generating 0 or 1. As the search
progresses, the values in the probability vectors will shift towards 1 or 0.
The pseudo code for PBIL is examplified in Listing 2.1.
Listing 2.1: The basic version of the PBIL algorithm for a binary alphabet,
adapted from Baluja and Caruana, 1995.
1 * * * * * * I n i t i a l i z e P r o b a b i l i t y Vector * * * * * *
2 f o r i :=1 to LENGTH do P [ i ] = 0 . 5 ;
3
4 while (NOT terminat ion condi t ion )
5 * * * * * Generate Samples * * * * *
6 f o r i :=1 to NUMBER_SAMPLES do
7 s o l u t i o n _ v e c t o r s [ i ] := generate _sample_ vec tor _ according _ to _ p r o b a b i l i t i e s ( P ) ;
8 eva lua t ions [ i ] := Evaluate _ Solut ion ( s o l u t i o n _ v e c t o r s [ i ] ) ;
9
10 s o l u t i o n _ v e c t o r s = s o r t _ v e c t o r s _from_ bes t _ to _ worst _ according _ to _ eva luat ions ( ) ;
11
12 * * * * Update P r o b a b i l i t y Vector towards bes t s o l u t i o n s * * * *
13 f o r j :=1 to NUMBER_OF_VECTORS_TO_UPDATE_FROM
14 f o r i :=1 to LENGTH do P [ i ] := P [ i ] * ( 1 . 0 − LR) + s o l u t i o n _ v e c t o r s [ j ] [ i ] * (LR) ;
15
16 PBIL CONSTANTS:
17 NUMBER_SAMPLES : the number of v e c t o r s generated before update of the p r o b a b i l i t y vec tor ( 2 0 0 ) .
18 LR : the learn ing rate , how f a s t to e x p l o i t the search performed ( 0 . 0 0 5 ) .
19 NUMER_OF_VECTORS_TO_UPDATE_FROM: the number of v e c t o r s in the current population which are
20 used to update the p r o b a b i l i t y vec tor ( 2 ) .
21 LENGTH: number of b i t s in the s o l u t i o n ( determined by the problem encoding ) .
The initial probability vectors are established. The new sample vectors
are generated followed by an evaluation of them, then sorted from best
to worst. The highest evaluation vectors are kept. The learning rate
(LR) determines how fast the probability vectors shifts each iteration. The
probability is defined by:
probabilityVectori = (probabilityVectori × (1.0 − LR)) + (LR × vectori)
where probabilityVectori is the probability of generating a 1 in bit position
i and vectori is the i position in the solution vector which the probability
vector is shifted towards. LR is the learning rate.
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Part II
The project
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Chapter 3
Approach
As an attempt to answer the problem statement, this thesis will make use
of all aspects described in Chapter 2 to solve a constrained optimization
problem with respect to network hardening. This thesis’ ambition is to
develop a tool which the goal is to analyze the current network security
state, based upon data from an attack graph, and be able to compute a
solution which will provide increased network security. More specific,
the tool should suggest what configurations should be fixed or patched.
However, one important factor is what or where we regard as a threat.
A potential attack could be initiated from anywhere, from the Internet
or even from any computer inside the network itself. Nonetheless, this
thesis assume the network and system administrator wants to secure
the network with respect towards attacks from outside the boundaries
of the network, in most cases the Internet. Moreover, the cost of
fixing/patching configurations varies. This research does not take into
account the cost variations of configurations but assume they all have same
cost. Additionally, this research does not take into account the severity
of different vulnerabilities, neither the likeliness of a vulnerability being
exploited.
The main goal in this study is to reduce the number of attack paths as many
as possible using PBIL, and the solution shall take usability into account
along with security. The reduction of attack paths will be illustrated as a
reduced attack graph. The reduced attack graph can be compared with the
initial attack graph in order to observe to what degree the graph has been
reduced. The initial attack graphs are added as appendices due to their
complexity. The goal is to be able to compare the reduced size of the graphs,
and due to the complexity of some graphs, details might not be readable on
printed paper. However, using PDF-readers provide scalability beneficial
for examining the details of the graphs.
The thesis will present two approaches both based on PBIL, one acceptance-
rejection approach, and the other is a penalty approach. These approaches
will be described later in this chapter. Figure 3.1 illustrates the desired solu-
tion. The parallelograms represent the tool developed in this study.
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Figure 3.1: Data flow.
The attack graphing tool used in this research is MulVAL attack graph.
MulVAL is open source and uses external sources to enrich vulnerability
data. Additionally, MulVAL uses a command-line interface which is useful
for fully automated graphing solutions. The tool provides csv-files which
are easy to understand and use while programming. This approach to
network hardening could use any attack graphing tool which provide data
files for importing into scripts, and in this case, MulVAL has shown itself
to be very satisfactory compared to others for this study. For solving
a combinatorial optimization problem with respect to initial network
conditions, this research has found the PBIL algorithm suitable.
We would like to maximize the network security while having a constraint:
the number of configurations in a network that can be activated or cannot
be deactivated. Standard PBIL method itself does not have the ability
to solve constrained optimization problem. In order to mitigate this
limitation, we rely on two algorithms, namely Acception/Rejection and
Penalty based PBIL. Chapter 3.2 will give an introduction to these two
methods for constrained optimization.
3.1 Measuring security
When evaluating samples in the computations, a formula for measuring
security is needed. A common first logical thought would be to evaluate
security in terms of the number of vulnerabilities an attacker from the
Internet are able to exploit. However, when evaluating security, what
is important to consider is the consequences we wish to avoid. In
terms of an attack graph, an exploit leads to a privilege, and a privilege
can be considered as a consequence (POST-condition) of realizing an
exploit. As described in Chapter 2.2 and illustrated in Figure 2.5, multiple
exploits may lead to the same privilege, they namely form an OR-
relation. Fixing/patching a vulnerability may not be sufficient to avoid
the consequence/privilege, as another vulnerability might lead to the the
same. In such a case, an attacker would just use another exploit in order
to reach a desired privilege. Therefore, evaluating security in terms of
total number of privileges an attacker from the Internet is able to gain is
suggested.
30
3.2 Constrained optimization
To solve a problem with constraints, we wish to apply two approaches:
the Acceptance–Rejection and the Penalty approach. These methods are basic
techniques for generating observations from a distribution. They are for
instance common in experiments using the Cross-Entropy method (CE)
which was presented in 2004 by Rubinstein and Kroese. The CE method
is widely applied in discrete optimization tasks and has similarities to
PBIL.
Acceptance-Rejection (AR) is a method for simple constraints. Suppose we
generate a random vector from a normal distribution, we can then accept
it if the vector falls in the interval of interest, or otherwise reject it. One
important note when using the AR method, the threshold for acceptance
should not be too high, or else it would cause rejection of too many
samples which in turn leads to time consuming computations. However,
when using this method correctly, it reduces the number of evaluations to
satisfactory samples only.
The Penalty is more generally applicable and quite easy to implement. The
approach involves using a penalty parameter which is dependant on the
original problem. The parameter can be, to some degree, a bit arbitrary,
and what is important to be aware of is that the solution to the problem can
be very sensitive to this parameter.
3.3 Constraints
Some human interaction is needed for hardening the network with
constraints. In the suggested solution, we can divide the constraints into
two parts.
3.3.1 Maximum configuration constraint
The user of the tool should decide a threshold for how many configurations
the tool should suggest fixed or patched. In a network of 100 exploit-related
configurations, a network and system administrator would for instance
like to know which 10 configurations should be fixed in order to provide
the best security. In an optimal network, all vulnerable services should be
patched at all times, but in real-life, this is not the case. Having this in mind,
a network and system administrator must prioritize when hardening the
network. He wants to know which immediate fixes he should do in order
to increase security in his network.
As an example, in a network of 145 exploit-related configurations c =
(c1, c2, c3, c4..., c145), the network and system administrator knows that
he has limited time to secure his network. He knows that within the
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coming day, he must increase the security dramatically. He also knows
that he can fix/patch approximately ten configurations within this time
limit. He should therefore be able to tell his network hardening tool to
suggest a maximum of ten configurations that should be fixed or patched.
Thus, the tool will present ten configurations that, while TRUE, leave the
network open to the biggest threat. The same configurations provide the
best possible security while FALSE. Such an suggestion output could be:
(c5, c14, c12, c39, c52, c67, c91, c102, c138, c144). The two approaches acceptance-
rejection and penalty are used to handle this type of constraint. How this
is implemented is described more thoroughly in Chapter 3.4.3.
3.3.2 Configuration disqualify constraint
The user of the tool should also be able to disqualify configurations which
should not be suggested fixed. Configuration examples include the fact
that an attacker is located on the Internet, that a service is available from the
Internet, a service is running or a service has a vulnerability. A network and
system administrator cannot help the fact that potential attackers are on
the Internet, which makes it impossible to fix. Additionally, enterprises
often rely on offering their services to the public through Internet. In
most cases, shutting access from the Internet towards its services is not
an option. Configurations representing available vulnerabilities should
always be able to be suggested fixed, but in some cases there is no patch or
fix available for that vulnerability in particular. The user should therefore
be able to tell the tool that such configurations cannot be suggested fixed
by the tool.
Given a network of ten exploit-related configurations c = (c1, c2, c3, c4..., c10),
the administrator should be able to give specific configuration constraints.
An example of such an constraint could be β = (c1, c2, c8). The solution
should never suggest to fix/patch any of the stated configurations β.
3.4 Planning process
This section describes how the planning process towards the tool. First,
necessary notations are established, followed by selection of programming
language. Lastly, the suggested approach when programming the tool is
displayed.
3.4.1 Notations
Given a list of exploit-related configurations:
c = (c1, c2, c3..., cN).
PBIL can generate samples with length N:
x = (x1, x2, x3...xN) where xi ∈ {0, 1}
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xi =
{
1 i f ci is enabled
0 i f ci is disabled
Enabled configurations are exploit-related configurations which are turned
on, also regarded as not suggested patched/fixed, TRUE configurations or in the
code read as 1. Disabled configurations are exploit-related configurations
which are turned off, also regarded as suggested patched/fixed, FALSE
configurations or in the code read as 0.
f = ∑ I(xi = 0) represents the number of disabled exploits where I(.) is
the indication function.
PBIL generates samples based on probability vectors:
p = (p1, p2, p3..., pN) where pi = probabilityVectori described in Chapter
2.5.2. pi is the probability that xi = 1.
3.4.2 Programming Language
The suggested tool will be written in the the programming language
Python. Python is efficient for file management and has numerous libraries
for efficient programming, making it ideal for this project. Additionally,
python is widely known for its simple syntax which makes the code easy
to read and comprehend.
3.4.3 Suggested approach
The suggested approach for programming is to follow the concept of PBIL.
The input data will be retrieved from MulVAL’s generated csv-files, namely
VERTICES.CSV and ARCS.CSV. The initial configurations, exploits and
privileges can be retrieved from VERTICES.CSV. The following excerpt is
an example of this file:
Listing 3.1: VERTICES.CSV.
3 , " canAccessHost ( c i t r i x S e r v e r _2) " , "OR" , 0
4 , "RULE 8 ( Access a host through execut ing code on the
machine ) " , "AND" , 0
5 , " hasAccount ( vic t im _2_2 , c i t r i x S e r v e r _2 , user ) " , " LEAF" , 1
6 , " principalCompromised ( vic t im _2_2) " , "OR" , 0
7 , "RULE 12 ( password s n i f f i n g ) " , "AND" , 0
8 , "RULE 3 ( remote e x p l o i t f o r a c l i e n t program ) " , "AND" , 0
9 , " accessMal ic iousInput ( c i t r i x S e r v e r _2 , v ic t im _2_2 , i e ) " , "OR
" , 0
1 0 , "RULE 22 ( Browsing a mal ic ious website ) " , "AND" , 0
Each line has four comma-separated values. The third value reveals what
type of entity the line serve as: LEAF are configurations, AND are exploits
and OR are privileges. The first value is an unique identifier (ID) of the
entity. The ARCS.CSV file represents the relations between the different
entities:
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Listing 3.2: ARCS.CSV.
1 4 ,1 ,−1
2 3 ,4 ,−1
3 2 ,3 ,−1
4 2 ,5 ,−1
5 7 ,1 ,−1
The two first values on each line correspond to a relation between two
entities. On line two we see that there is a relation between the entity with
the unique ID 3 and 4. Looking back at Listing 3.1, we know that there
is a relation between 3,"canAccessHost(citrixServer_2) and RULE 8 (Access
a host through executing code on the machine). It means that by exploiting
vulnerability ID 4, we gain the privilege with ID 3.
When importing the data, the suggested solution is to translate them into
the following lists and directories in python:
• A list containing the ID of all the configurations. Such a list will be
useful for knowing which ID number is a configuration, and also
useful for when setting the initial configurations.
• A list containing the ID of all the exploits.
• A list containing the ID of all the privileges.
• A dictionary of all the exploits and their corresponding AND-
relations.
• A dictionary of all the privileges and their corresponding OR-
relations.
• A dictionary of all the exploits and the privilege they lead to.
When running the script, it should count the number of configurations and
create a probability vector list where the number of vectors correspond the
the number of configurations and set all initial values to 0.5. If a graph
show 6 initial configurations, the initial probability vectors should be a list
[0.5,0.5,0.5,0.5,0.5,0.5].
in the continuation, the suggested program should work in a following
loop, where one lap in the loop is one iteration:
Listing 3.3: Iteration loop.
1 converged=Fa lse
2 count=0
3 while ( converged == Fa lse ) and ( count < max_i te ra t ions ) :
4 genNum=generateVectors ( )
5 avg= f i n d B e s t L i s t s (genNum)
6 sample=updateProbVector ( avg )
7 converged=hasConverged ( sample )
8 count=count+1
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• Line 3: Continue to next iteration as long as the probability vectors
have not converged or reached the highest number of iterations
given.
• Line 4: Generate a given number of samples with random numbers
in a 0-1 interval for each probability vector. If the generated number
is less than the corresponding probability vector, then regard the
configuration to be TRUE (1), otherwise regard the configuration
as FALSE (0). Check whether a disqualified configuration is
FALSE, and change it to TRUE. While using the acceptance-rejection
method, disregard samples that exceeds a given number of FALSE
configurations (threshold t). Stop generating samples when there are
X number of accepted samples. X is recommended to be 100.
• Line 5: Evaluate each sample according to the measured security as
described in section 3.1. Let measured security be m, where optimal
security m is 0. When using the penalty approach, add the penalty p
to the number of privileges an attacker can realise (m). The suggested
approach is to only add a penalty to samples that exceeds a threshold
(t) of FALSE configurations ( f ) in a sample. Let p = λ× ( f − t). The
penalty parameter λ and threshold parameter t should be established
based on the total number of configurations given in the attack
graph to ensure scalability. In both approaches, acceptance-rejection
and penalty, security s is measured by s = m, meanwhile samples
penalised in the penalty approach by exceeding f > t are calculated
s = m+ λ× ( f − t). The ten best results from the total number of 100
samples are recalculated into one sample where the mean of every
valuex from the ten best samples are kept as shown in Figure 3.2.
• Line 6: Now the newly generated sample (called the elite sample)
can be weighed with the previous sample. The learning rate (LR)
indicates how fast the algorithm learns and the f reshSample can be
calculated as f reshSamplei = oldSamplei × (1− LR) + newSamplei ×
LR. The suggested LR should be 0.05 or 0.1.
• Line 7: The sample is checked whether it has converged or not. It has
not converged if a samplei > 0.01 AND samplei < 0.99.
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Notation Description
m Number of privileges an attacker can gain from a given
configuration
f Number of FALSE configurations in a sample. f = ∑ I(xi =
0) described in 3.4.1.
t Threshold. The threshold states a point of undesired amount
of FALSE configurations.
λ The penalty parameter.
p Penalty. Penalty p = λ× ( f − t).
s Calculated security. Acceptance-rejection approach: s = m.
Penalty approach: s = m + p.
Table 3.1: Notations
Figure 3.2: Mean of valuex from best samples.
3.5 Example case
Figure 3.5 is an example of a very simple attack graph. The graph is based
on a simple network of three nodes. In the network, an attacker has been
identified on the Internet (ID 18), and he has access to the webserver (ID 17).
If the network and system administrator wanted complete security from
the Internet, he would deny all access from it by removing configuration
ID 17.In that case, attackers would not gain any privileges on the network
and his work would be done. This is in most cases not an option, and the
user of the tool will have to disqualify ID 17 and 18. This tells the tool
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to never suggest fixing or patching these configurations. The following
figures show how the graph will be reduced to when when disqualifying
different options.
Disqualifying ID 18 and 17. The tool should suggest to fix/patch
configuration ID 19 or 20 as both configurations lead to same exploit. Fixing
one of them is sufficient for securing the network towards further multi-
stage attacks.
Figure 3.3: Attack graph reduced when disqualifying ID 17 and 18.
Disqualifying ID 17,18,19,20. ID 19 represents a service (apache) running.
The system administrator must have this exact service running and
disqualifies it. ID 20 represents a vulnerability. The administrator cannot
find a patch for this vulnerability so he disqualifies it. The tool should
suggest to fix/patch configuration ID 12 plus 24 or 25.
Figure 3.4: Attack graph reduced when disqualifying ID 17,18,19,20.
From the example experiments, we see what the initial attack graph is
reduced to when giving various configuration constraints. It is easy to
reduce the attack paths in a network of just a few paths as given in Figure
3.5, however, the work becomes more tedious when the complexity of the
network increases.
3.6 Experiments
The experiments conducted in this study will include three different
networks, all of which will have different constraints in terms of initial
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configurations. The networks represent a variety of complexities. Their
initial attack graphs are generated in MulVAL using manually written
input files. It means that the graphs are not generated based on a real-
world network.
Complexity Description
Low
Nodes: 6
Exploits: 21
Configurations: 20
Privileges: 18
The network itself is not complex. Two nodes are con-
nected directly to the internet through the perime-
ter firewall. The four other nodses are connected to
an internal router, which in turn is connected to the
perimeter firewall.
Medium
Nodes: 8
Exploits: 17
Configurations: 16
Privileges: 14
The network is more complex than the previous
one and has two firewalls, one perimeter firewall
and one internal firewall. However, the number
of configurations and exploits are lower than the
previous one.
High
Locations: 2
Subnets: 14
Exploits: 33
Configurations: 31
Privileges: 28
The network is mirrored on two different locations,
both connected to the internet. Each location has
7 subnets, constituting a total of 14 subnets. Each
location has 3 firewalls and one router.
Table 3.2: Overview of networks used in experiments
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Illustrations of suggested network topologies
Enclave Network (Medium sized network)Attacker must cross firewall
Subnet_2
Internet Explorer
Attacker (Internet)
hacl(Internet, router, httpProtocol, httpPort).
hacl(internet, webserver,tcp, 80).
Perimeter 
firewall
File server
windows_2003_server
Subnet_1
windows2000
Workstation
acrobat
Webserver
.Net Framework
Mail Server
Router
Connection blocked by firewall
Figure 3.6: Topology network 1.
Enclave Network II
OperatingStation
Internet Explorer
Attacker (Internet)
hacl(Internet, internalFW, httpProtocol, httpPort).
hacl(internet, webserver,tcp, 80).
Perimeter 
firewall
File server
windows_2003_server
CommServer
windows2000
Workstation
acrobat
Webserver
.Net Framework
VPN Server
Internal 
Firewall
Citrix server
windows_2003_server
dataHistorian
Excel
1
Figure 3.7: Topology network 2.
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Figure 3.8: Topology network 3.
3.7 Result data
The results should provide sufficient data for answering the following
questions:
1. Is PBIL suitable for this exact type of computation?
2. How does the learning rate impact a computation?
3. How does the threshold parameter impact evaluations?
4. Can we compare the two approaches, acceptance-rejection and penalty?
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Part III
Results and Conclusion
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Chapter 4
Results
This chapter will describe how the tool was programmed. Further on,
experiments on how PBIL can reduce the number of attack paths is carried
out in addition to experiments directed against the approaches acceptance-
rejection and penalty.
4.1 Implementation
This section will describe how the different methods described in Listing
3.3 work in depth. Examples from source code are shown where deemed
appropriate.
4.1.1 Generating samples
The method generate has three parameters, the current probability vector
sample, maximum number of samples to be generated and a list of
configurations which cannot be FALSE/0 (user constraint). The method
generates a sample of random numbers between a 0-1 interval where each
number is compared to the corresponding value in the current probability
vector sample. If the generated value is less than the current value, it gets
defined as 1 and 0 if more. Lastly, the sample gets evaluated in a method
satisfactoryVectors, which will be described in the next paragraph.
Listing 4.1: Generating samples.
1 def generate ( sample , max_samples , l i s tOfConf ,
cannotDisableConf ) :
2 i ter_Samples = [ ]
3 while len ( i ter_Samples ) < max_samples :
4 newSample = [ ]
5 for i in sample : # G e n e r a t e random number
be tween 0 and 1
6 val=random . random ( )
7 i f val <= i :
45
8 q=1
9 e lse :
10 q=0
11 newSample . append ( q )
12 i f s a t i s f a c t o r y V e c t o r s ( newSample ,
cannotDisableConf ) : # D i s r e g a r d sample i f
i t d o e s not s a t i s f y demands
13 i t e r . append ( newSample )
14 e lse :
15 continue
16 return i t e r
The satisfactoryVectors method has two functions:
1. If a configuration has landed on value 0 and the user has specified it
not to be (user has disqualified the given configuration), the method
changes the value to 1. While using the penalty approach, the method
ends here, it always returns True.
2. While using the acceptance-rejection approach, the method counts the
number of zeros in a sample and compares it to the threshold t. If
the number of zeros in a sample exceeds the threshold, the method
returns False, and the sample is discarded.
changes the values to
Listing 4.2: Check sample towards constraints.
1 def s a t i s f a c t o r y V e c t o r s ( newSample , cannotDisableConf ) :
2 #Make s u r e a l l t h e c o n f i g u r a t i o n s which u s e r has
s p e c i f i e d not t o turn o f f a r e t urne d on
3 for idx , val in enumerate ( cannotDisableConf ) :
4 i f val== ’X ’ :
5 newSample [ idx ]=1
6
7 count=0
8 for i in newSample :
9 i f i ==0:
10 count=count+1
11
12 #Not more than a g i v e n p e r c e n t o f t h e
c o n f i g u r a t i o n s s h o u l d be s u g g e s t e d d i s a b l e d ,
d i s r e g a r d sample o t h e r w i s e
13 threshold =0.2
14 i f count <= i n t ( round ( len ( newSample ) * threshold ) ) : #
l e n ( newSample ) * 0 . 2 : Here you change t h e p e r c e n t
o f s u g g e s t e d d i s a b l e d c o n f i g u r a t i o n s
15 return True
16 e lse :
17 return Fa lse
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4.1.2 Evaluate samples
The method findBestLists has three objectives:
1. To evaluate every sample, all possible paths to reach a privilege based
on the sample data is tested in a loop. If the loop does not find a way
to the privilege, it is regarded as unreachable. The penalty approach
also adds a penalty λ× ( f − t) (See Table 3.1 for notation details) if
the number of FALSE configurations exceeds a threshold t where the
penalty parameter λ and threshold parameter t is specified by the
user. Listing 4.3 shows the penalty that returns a penalty which is
added to the formula. If there is no penalty, it return 0 penalty.
2. Retrieve the 10 best samples based on the evaluations.
3. Calculate and return the elite sample, it is the average of vectorx from
the 10 best samples as Figure 3.2 exemplifies.
Listing 4.3: Penalty.
1 def getPenal ty ( sample ) :
2 threshold= i n t ( round ( len ( sample ) * 0 . 2 ) )
3 penaltyConstant =1
4 numOfDisabled=sum( x == 0 for x in sample )
5 i f numOfDisabled > threshold :
6 return ( numOfDisabled−threshold ) *
penaltyConstant
7 e lse :
8 return 0
4.1.3 Update probability vectors
When updating the existing probability vectors, the metod updateProbVector
takes two parameters, of the newly generated elite sample and the
current probability vectors. The learning rate (LR) decides how fast the
computation learns each iteration. In Listing 4.4, the RT is 0.1.
Listing 4.4: Update probability vector.
1 def updateProbVector ( i terSample , sample ) :
2 # R e c a l c u l a t e s t h e new v a l u e o f t h e sample b a s e d
upon t h e o l d sample and t h e new improved
s o l u t i o n
3 l earn ingRate =0.1
4 weightNew=learningRate
5 weightOld=1− l earn ingRate
6 newVal = [ ]
7 for (new , old ) in zip ( i terSample , sample ) :
8 newVal . append ( ( weightNew*new) +( weightOld *
old ) )
9 return newVal
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4.1.4 Convergence
This method returns FALSE if any of the vectors in the newly updated
probability vector has converged. The tool allow one percent tolerance,
meaning there has to be at least 0.99 probability of generating a 0 or 1 on
all vectors in the next iteration in order to declare all vectors converged.
When converged, the iteration-loop stops and the tool can present the
findings.
Listing 4.5: Converged.
1 def hasConverged ( sample ) :
2 converged=True
3 for i in sample :
4 i f i > 0 . 0 1 and i < 0 . 9 9 :
5 converged=Fa lse
6
7 return converged
4.2 Experiments
Experiments will be conducted on three suggested networks. Their
current attack graphs are added to the appendix. However, due to large
graphs, they might not be readable on paper, only in a PDF-reader. The
experiments will state the constraints given in the respective experiment.
The configuration disqualify constraints are stated as a list of unique
configuration ID’s. Results will show how the attack graphs are reduced,
and how the two approaches act. Result tables are limited to just a few
lines in this report, though every experiments are conducted at least 30
times. Mean values are based on the entire experiment population.
4.3 Network 2 experiment
Network 2 is presented first. This network has the least complex
attack graph (see Appendix B.1) of the three presented networks.The
experiment should show how the tool reduces an attack graph with given
constraints.
In this experiment, the network and system administrator needs to harden
his network quickly. Therefore, he wants the tool to suggest not more
than three configurations which need to be fixed/patched. He determines
the constraint maximum configuration constraint to three. Due to usability
requirements and restrictions, he has the following configuration disqualify
constraints:
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Configuration disqualify constraints
11:attackerLocated(internet):1
25:hacl(commServer,internet,httpProtocol,httpPort):1
12:hacl(citrixServer,internet,httpProtocol,httpPort):1
45:hacl(vpnServer,internet,httpProtocol,httpPort):1
27:vulExists(commServer,’CVE-2010-0483’,windows_2000,
remoteClient,privEscalation):1
14:vulExists(citrixServer,’CVE-2010-0490’,ie,remoteClient,
privEscalation):1
46:inCompetent(victim_5):1
13:inCompetent(victim_2):1
26:inCompetent(victim_1):1
Table 4.1: Disqualify constraints network 1
• Configuration 11: Attackers are available on the Internet. The
administrator knows he cannot change this.
• Configuration 25,12,45: Due to requirements where keeping services
available to the Internet, the administrator decides to disqualify these
configurations.
• Configuration 27,14: The administrator knows that patches for these
vulnerabilities are not available.
• Configuration 46,13,26: The users in his network cannot be relied
on when it comes to security. He takes into account that there is a
possibility that the users might perform actions critical to security.
The tool, independent of which approach, repeatedly give the same results:
’5’, ’19’, ’47’.
• 5:hasAccount(victim_2,citrixServer,user):1
• 19:hasAccount(victim_1,commServer,user):1
• 47:vulExists(vpnServer,’CVE-2010-0492’,openvpn,remoteClient,
privEscalation):1
Fixing/pathching these configurations result in the following attack graph
which has reduced the number of privileges an attacker can gain from 14
to 3.
Figure 4.1: Reduced attack graph network 2.
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4.3.1 Network 1 experiment
The main goal of this experiment is to observe how the two approaches
penalty and acceptance-rejection compare while having a LR of 0.1 and a LR of
0.05. Another intention is to observe how accept-rejection sample generation
progresses over iterations. The initial attack graph of the network is in
Appendix A.1.
This network has been given the following constraints:
• Maximum configuration constraint: 4
• Configuration disqualify constraint: ’11’,’25’,’12’,’38’,’39’,’57’
Acceptance-rejection
The maximum configuration constraint implies that all generated samples
with more than 4 disabled values should be rejected.
Experiment LR=0.1
Suggested solution Iterations Seconds
(’13’, ’26’, ’40’, ’58’) 65 11.6
(’14’, ’26’, ’32’, ’58’) 64 11.8
(’14’, ’26’, ’40’, ’58’) 71 12.8
(’14’, ’26’, ’40’, ’58’) 75 13.4
(’13’, ’26’, ’40’, ’58’) 85 15.2
(’13’, ’26’, ’40’, ’58’) 102 18.1
(’14’, ’26’, ’40’, ’58’) 90 16.3
(’13’, ’26’, ’32’, ’58’) 70 12.5
Table 4.2: Results Network 1 Acceptance-rejection LR=0.1
Mean iterations = 77 Mean seconds = 13.9
Experiment LR=0.05
Suggested solution Iterations Seconds
(’13’, ’26’, ’40’, ’58’) 173 30.6
(’14’, ’26’, ’40’, ’58’) 198 35.9
(’13’, ’26’, ’32’, ’58’) 175 30.7
(’14’, ’26’, ’32’, ’58’) 198 34.9
(’14’, ’26’, ’32’, ’58’) 186 32.9
(’14’, ’26’, ’32’, ’58’) 164 29.3
(’14’, ’26’, ’40’, ’58’) 148 26.1
(’14’, ’26’, ’32’, ’58’) 177 31.7
Table 4.3: Results Network 1 Acceptance-rejection LR=0.05
Mean iterations = 171 Mean seconds = 30.6
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Penalty
λ = 1 and t = 4
The threshold value t is how the penalty approach annotates the maximum
configuration constraint.
Experiment LR=0.1
Suggested solution Iterations Seconds
(’14’, ’26’, ’32’, ’58’) 69 14.9
(’13’, ’26’, ’40’, ’58’) 73 16.8
(’13’, ’26’, ’40’, ’58’) 86 16.5
(’14’, ’26’, ’32’, ’58’) 75 13.7
(’13’, ’26’, ’32’, ’58’) 65 12.1
(’14’, ’26’, ’32’, ’58’) 73 13.5
(’14’, ’26’, ’40’, ’58’) 77 14.6
(’13’, ’26’, ’40’, ’58’) 83 15.3
Table 4.4: Results Network 1 Penalty LR=0.1
Mean iterations = 80 Mean seconds = 17.9
Experiment LR=0.05
Suggested solution Iterations Seconds
(’13’, ’26’, ’32’, ’58’) 129 24.3
(’14’, ’26’, ’40’, ’58’) 179 32.4
(’14’, ’26’, ’32’, ’58’) 146 26.7
(’14’, ’26’, ’32’, ’58’) 213 39.4
(’14’, ’26’, ’40’, ’58’) 152 27.7
(’13’, ’26’, ’32’, ’58’) 177 32.2
(’14’, ’26’, ’32’, ’58’) 152 27.9
(’13’, ’26’, ’32’, ’58’) 156 28.3)
Table 4.5: Results Network 1 Penalty LR=0.05
Mean iterations = 161 Mean seconds = 29.6
We can observe the fact that the various suggested solution results within
each experiment varies to some degree. However, the experiments between
themselves look more or less similar. The reason for this is explained in
Chapter 5. However, regardless to which computation output, the reduced
attack graph end up identical to Figure 4.2. The hardening reduces the
number of accessible privileges from 18 to 2.
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Figure 4.2: Reduced attack graph network 1.
Figure 4.3 illustrates how the acceptance-reject approach generates samples
per iteration in this experiment.
Figure 4.3: Rejected samples per iteration.
Compared to the penalty approach, acceptance-reject generates around
double the amount of samples in a computation with the same amount
of iterations. The findings are presented in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Generated samples in one computation.
4.4 Experiment network 3
Experiments in Chapter 4.3.1 show that results between the two approaches
vary based on the learning rate. The main goal of this experiment
is to observe how the two approaches penalty and acceptance-rejection
compare with respect to time per iteration. Lastly, an experiment on
whether increasing the LR dramatically will show deviation in the results
is conducted. The initial attack graph is in Appendix C.1.
This network has been given the following constraints:
• Maximum configuration constraint (threshold): 20 % of the configu-
rations.
• Configuration disqualify constraint: ’12’,’13’,’14’,’25’,’26’,’45’,
’11’,’58’,’59’,’71’,’72’,’90’,’91’,’46’,’47’.
Also in this network, the results in Table 4.6 display that the acceptance-
rejection approach has an advantage with respect to time with a higher
learning rate (0.10), meanwhile penalty approach solves the optimization
faster with a lower learning rate (0.05).
Mean computation time in seconds
Acceptance rejection Penalty
LR 0.10 37.37 38.43
LR 0.05 78.63 71.85
Table 4.6: Mean computation time network 3
The following graphs illustrate how the approaches behave with respect
to time per iteration given two different learning rates. The graphs
confirm the previous results in Table 4.6. A lower LR result in a lower
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computation time per iteration in favor of the penalty approach. Higher LR
shows a lower computation time per iteration in favor of the accept-reject
approach.
Figure 4.5: Seconds per iteration LR 0.05.
Figure 4.6: Seconds per iteration LR 0.10.
Independent of approach and LR, the suggested solution are the same.
Table 4.7 shows the diversity of the various results.
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Results from various computations
Suggested solution
’5’, ’19’, ’39’, ’52’, ’65’, ’92’
’5’, ’27’, ’39’, ’52’, ’73’, ’92’
’5’, ’19’, ’40’, ’60’, ’65’, ’84’
’5’, ’27’, ’39’, ’52’, ’73’, ’92’
’5’, ’19’, ’39’, ’52’, ’65’, ’92’
’5’, ’27’, ’39’, ’60’, ’65’, ’84’
Table 4.7: Suggested solution network 3
Increasing the LR dramatically does not provide deviating results, even in
a population of 60 computations. Table 4.8 presents an excerpt from the
collected results.
Learning rate 0.99 results
Suggested solution
’5’, ’27’, ’39’, ’52’, ’65’, ’84’
’5’, ’19’, ’39’, ’52’, ’73’, ’92’
’5’, ’27’, ’40’, ’60’, ’65’, ’84’
’5’, ’19’, ’40’, ’52’, ’65’, ’84’
’5’, ’19’, ’40’, ’60’, ’65’, ’92’
’5’, ’27’, ’39’, ’52’, ’73’, ’92’
Table 4.8: Incrased learning rate results
Even though the suggested solutions are different from computation to
computation, any of the given solutions result in the reduced attack graph
in Figure 4.7. The number of privileges an attacker can gain has been
reduced from 28 to 7.
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Chapter 5
Analysis
The results prove that a network can be hardened with simple steps. All
experiments show that the initial attack graphs are reduced dramatically
after running the presented tool. The results also show that the given
constraints also are maintained.
Experiments on network 1 and 2 result in different suggested solutions,
as for instance in Table 4.8. We can observe that all results suggest
fixing/patching configuration ID 5 in the first column. However, the other
columns show some variations. In the second column, for instance, we
see that various results differ between configuration 19 and 27. What is
important to realize is that deactivating either of these configurations lead
to the same result. Configuration ID 19 and 27 are both AND relations to
the same exploit. Deactivating either of them leads to a non-exploitable
vulnerability. As stated in Chapter 3, we assume in this thesis that all
configurations have the same cost. This tool does therefore not care which
configuration should be deactivated as long as the the results provide equal
security.
The new probability vector is a weighted combination of the probability
vector at the previous time instant and the elite sample. Given a low
learning rate, we will put more weight on the previous probability vector
and less on the elite sample. The "degree of freedom" of our solution is
reduced and is bounded to the previous probability vector.
We can observe in terms of iterations that doubling the learning rate
approximately halves the number of iterations needed for all probability
vectors to converge. In Chapter 4.3.1 and 4.3.1, we can observe that the
methods acceptance-rejection and penalty have little variation in number
of iterations when solving the same task. What also is worth noting is
that the acceptance-rejection method generates a noticeable greater amount
of samples during a computation as illustrated in Figure 4.4. Figure
4.3 tells us that the method generates an enormous amount of samples
the first iterations compared with the penalty method, and the number
decreases exponentially with the number of iterations. In the given
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network environments, the time of generating more samples is negligible
when comparing the two methods. However, using the acceptance-rejection
method with a very low threshold and in more complex environments
might result in notably increased computation time. What also is important
is that a very low threshold can result in a solution which will not harden
the network significantly. The user of the tool will need to have a realistic
approximation when determining the threshold value, because one cannot
necessarily expect the tool to provide a good solution with only being
able to suggest just a few fixes/patches in a large network with numerous
constraints.
Observing the number of iterations instead of time removes the factor
that inefficient code entails. This research has nevertheless measured
effectiveness with respect to time. From observing the results, the time
taken to compute a solution also doubles when halving the learning
rate. However, the effectiveness of two methods prove themselves when
changing the learning rate. Figure 4.5 proves that the penalty method
spends less time per iteration than the acceptance-rejection method when
having a low learning rate of 0.05. The tables are turned when doubling
the learning rate (0.10), then the acceptance-rejection method proves itself
more effective per iteration in a computation as Figure 4.6 proves.
When increasing the learning rate dramatically, even up to 0.99, the results
remain unchanged and the computation time gets reduced enormously.
Even though the results in our experiments showed the most optimal
solution with the given constraints, increasing the learning rate decreases
the reliability of the solution considerably. To consider the results reliable,
the learning rate should not exceed 0.1, and lower rates are even more
reliable.
Problem solving has been executed on three differently sized networks
with different constraints. Based on our experimental results, we can
finally state that the suggested tool is scalable, reliable and proves
an effective method for constrained optimization with respect to initial
configuration-based network hardening. Both methods, acceptance-rejection
and penalty have proven themselves effective to handle constraints for this
type of problem solving. For the most reliable results, penalty method has
proved to be a more effective method. This method is also more generally
applicable and is also easy to implement.
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Chapter 6
Discussion and Conclusion
In order to ensure full security, a network and system administrator has
to take actions at the expense of usability. In some cases, a network can
only be regarded safe from potential attackers from the Internet when
disconnected from the Internet itself. Doing so is normally not an option
for any enterprise or organisation as they rely on providing services to the
public. This thesis has found a solution which is able to balance network
security and usability.
Vulnerability scanners provide useful information about available vulner-
abilities in a network. However, they do not take into account that ad-
vanced attackers perform multi-stage attacks where one vulnerability after
the other is exploited in order to gain several privileges in a network. Addi-
tionally, vulnerability scanners can provide extensive vulnerability reports.
The network and system administrator does not know where to start. At-
tack graphs can show how one vulnerability can lead to another through a
relational graph where especially the PRE and POST-conditions of the vul-
nerabilities are detailed. MulVAL is an example of such a attack graphing
tool.
MulVAL provides a foundation for hardening a network using constrained
optimization with respect to initial configurations. This research has
found that learning automata techniques are convenient for such an
optimization. More specifically, Population-Based Incremental Learning,
an algorithm suitable for solving combinatorial problems, can be utilized
for network hardening optimization. Moreover, this thesis has found that
two different methods can be implemented into the PBIL algorithm to
ensure that the optimization can be constrained, namely acceptance-rejection
and penalty method. The constraints represent network usability and work
load (number of fixes and patches) decided by the network and system
administrator.
The developed tool has demonstrated that PBIL is, in fact, convenient for
such an optimization. The experiments conducted in this research have
shown that complex initial attack graphs can be reduced dramatically by
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just a few steps. They also show that this can be done even with extensive
constraints. The methods acceptance-rejection and penalty have both shown
themselves effective for implementing constraints into the optimization.
However, the acceptance-rejection method is prone to increased computation
time when having a low threshold in large networks because it results in
tremendous amount of rejected samples. Both methods have their merits,
but the penalty method is more generally applicable.
From a more reflective perspective and invitation for future work, the
suggested solution does not take into account that fixing or patching
various configurations have different cost. Neither does it take into account
that some vulnerabilities lead to heavier impacts than others, nor the
likeliness of being exploited. Vulnerability databases and other sources
provide helpful information which can be utilized to determine impact,
likeliness and cost. Taking these factors into account will provide more
intelligent results.
Other types of requirements can also be implemented. The user of the tool
would in some cases require a specific attack path to be reduced or require
that a particular exploit cannot be exploited. Such an approach could rely
on breaking an attack graph down into the various attack paths before
computing a solution. Moreover, the results of this research has relied on
experiments on non-real networks. Using this approach on a complex real-
life running network would give an impression on whether this is useful
and effective in practical network and system administration.
In summary, thesis has introduced a method where PBIL can be used
to solve network hardening optimization problems with the intention of
providing reliable information to quickly correct misconfigurations that
may lead to multi-stage attacks in a network. The solution can account for
both security and usability requirements through adopting the constraint
methods accept-rejection and penalty. A tool has been developed which
can be used in practical network and system administration and relies on
initial configurations in order to perform network hardening. Experimental
results demonstrate that this approach is effective, scalable and reliable.
Lastly, this field of study has enormous potential and this approach to
network hardening provides an excellent basis for future works.
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Note that some of the attack graphs might not be readable on paper, but
only while enlarging the page in a PDF-reader.
67
68
Appendix A
Network 1 attack graph
69
1:execC
ode(m
ailServer,root):0
2:R
U
L
E
 4 (Trojan horse installation):0
3:accessFile(m
ailServer,write,’/export’):0
4:R
U
L
E
 17 (NFS shell):0
5:hacl(webServer,m
ailServer,nfsProtocol,nfsPort):1
6:nfsExportInfo(m
ailServer,’/export’,write,webServer):1
7:execC
ode(webServer,apache):0
8:R
U
L
E
 2 (rem
ote exploit of a server program
):0
9:netA
ccess(webServer,tcp,80):0
10:R
U
L
E
 6 (direct network access):0
11:hacl(internet,webServer,tcp,80):1
12:attackerL
ocated(internet):1
24:R
U
L
E
 22 (Browsing a m
alicious website):0
37:R
U
L
E
 22 (Browsing a m
alicious website):0
56:R
U
LE 22 (Browsing a m
alicious website):0
13:netw
orkServiceInfo(webServer,httpd,tcp,80,apache):1
14:vulE
xists(webServer,’CAN-2002-0392’,httpd,rem
oteExploit,privEscalation):1
15:execC
ode(subnet_1,user):0
18:R
U
L
E
 8 (Access a host through executing code on the m
achine):0
21:R
U
L
E
 12 (password sniffing):0
16:R
U
L
E
 0 (W
hen a principal is com
prom
ised any m
achine he has an account on will also be com
prom
ised):0 17:canA
ccessH
ost(subnet_1):0
19:hasA
ccount(victim
_1,subnet_1,user):1
22:R
U
L
E
 3 (rem
ote exploit for a client program
):0
20:principalC
om
prom
ised(victim
_1):0
23:accessM
aliciousInput(subnet_1,victim
_1,windows_2000):0
25:hacl(subnet_1,internet,httpProtocol,httpPort):1
26:inC
om
petent(victim
_1):1
27:vulE
xists(subnet_1,’CVE-2010-0483’,windows_2000,rem
oteClient,privEscalation):1
28:execC
ode(subnet_2,user):0
31:R
U
L
E
 8 (Access a host through executing code on the m
achine):0
34:R
U
L
E
 12 (password sniffing):0
29:R
U
L
E
 0 (W
hen a principal is com
prom
ised any m
achine he has an account on will also be com
prom
ised):0
30:canA
ccessH
ost(subnet_2):0
32:hasA
ccount(victim
_2,subnet_2,user):1
35:R
U
LE 3 (rem
ote exploit for a client program
):0
33:principalC
om
prom
ised(victim
_2):0
36:accessM
aliciousInput(subnet_2,victim
_2,ie):0
38:hacl(subnet_2,internet,httpProtocol,httpPort):1
39:inC
om
petent(victim
_2):1
40:vulE
xists(subnet_2,’CVE-2010-0490’,ie,rem
oteClient,privEscalation):1
41:execC
ode(workStation,root):0
42:R
U
L
E
 4 (Trojan horse installation):0
43:accessFile(workStation,write,’/export’):0
44:R
U
L
E
 17 (NFS shell):0
45:hacl(fileServer,workStation,nfsProtocol,nfsPort):1
46:nfsExportInfo(workStation,’/export’,write,fileServer):1
47:execC
ode(fileServer,user):0
50:R
U
L
E
 8 (Access a host through executing code on the m
achine):0
53:R
U
LE 12 (password sniffing):0
48:R
U
L
E
 0 (W
hen a principal is com
prom
ised any m
achine he has an account on will also be com
prom
ised):0
49:canA
ccessH
ost(fileServer):0
51:hasA
ccount(victim
_3,fileServer,user):1
54:R
U
LE 3 (rem
ote exploit for a client program
):0
52:principalC
om
prom
ised(victim
_3):0
55:accessM
aliciousInput(fileServer,victim
_3,windows_2003_server):0
57:hacl(fileServer,internet,httpProtocol,httpPort):1
58:inC
om
petent(victim
_3):1
59:vulExists(fileServer,’CVE-2010-0812’,windows_2003_server,rem
oteClient,privEscalation):1
Figure
A
.1:Initialattack
graph
netw
ork
1
70
Appendix B
Network 2 attack graph
71
1:execC
ode(citrixServer,user):0
4:R
U
L
E
 8 (Access a host through executing code on the m
achine):0
7:R
U
L
E
 12 (password sniffing):0
2:R
U
L
E
 0 (W
hen a principal is com
prom
ised any m
achine he has an account on will also be com
prom
ised):0
3:canA
ccessH
ost(citrixServer):0
5:hasA
ccount(victim
_2,citrixServer,user):1
8:R
U
L
E
 3 (rem
ote exploit for a client program
):06:principalC
om
prom
ised(victim
_2):0
9:accessM
aliciousInput(citrixServer,victim
_2,ie):0
10:R
U
L
E
 22 (Browsing a m
alicious website):0
11:attackerL
ocated(internet):1
24:R
U
L
E
 22 (Browsing a m
alicious website):0
44:R
U
L
E
 22 (Browsing a m
alicious website):0
12:hacl(citrixServer,internet,httpProtocol,httpPort):1
13:inC
om
petent(victim
_2):1
14:vulE
xists(citrixServer,’CVE-2010-0490’,ie,rem
oteClient,privEscalation):1
15:execC
ode(com
m
Server,user):0
18:R
U
L
E
 8 (Access a host through executing code on the m
achine):0
21:R
U
L
E
 12 (password sniffing):0
31:R
U
L
E
 5 (m
ulti-hop access):0
16:R
U
L
E
 0 (W
hen a principal is com
prom
ised any m
achine he has an account on will also be com
prom
ised):0
17:canA
ccessH
ost(com
m
Server):0
19:hasA
ccount(victim
_1,com
m
Server,user):1
22:R
U
L
E
 3 (rem
ote exploit for a client program
):0
20:principalC
om
prom
ised(victim
_1):0
23:accessM
aliciousInput(com
m
Server,victim
_1,windows_2000):0
25:hacl(com
m
Server,internet,httpProtocol,httpPort):1
26:inC
om
petent(victim
_1):1
27:vulE
xists(com
m
Server,’CVE-2010-0483’,windows_2000,rem
oteClient,privEscalation):1
28:execC
ode(dataHistorian,root):0
29:R
U
L
E
 2 (rem
ote exploit of a server program
):0
30:netA
ccess(dataHistorian,httpProtocol,httpPort):0
32:hacl(com
m
Server,dataHistorian,httpProtocol,httpPort):1
33:netw
orkServiceInfo(dataHistorian,m
ountd,httpProtocol,httpPort,root):1
34:vulE
xists(dataHistorian,’CVE-2010-0494’,m
ountd,rem
oteExploit,privEscalation):1
35:execC
ode(vpnServer,user):0
38:R
U
L
E
 8 (Access a host through executing code on the m
achine):0
41:R
U
L
E
 12 (password sniffing):0
36:R
U
L
E
 0 (W
hen a principal is com
prom
ised any m
achine he has an account on will also be com
prom
ised):0
37:canA
ccessH
ost(vpnServer):0
39:hasA
ccount(victim
_5,vpnServer,user):1
42:R
U
L
E
 3 (rem
ote exploit for a client program
):0
40:principalC
om
prom
ised(victim
_5):0
43:accessM
aliciousInput(vpnServer,victim
_5,openvpn):0
45:hacl(vpnServer,internet,httpProtocol,httpPort):1
46:inC
om
petent(victim
_5):1
47:vulE
xists(vpnServer,’CVE-2010-0492’,openvpn,rem
oteClient,privEscalation):1
Figure
B.1:Initialattack
graph
netw
ork
2
72
Appendix C
Network 3 attack graph
73
1:execC
ode(citrixServer_2,user):0
4:R
U
L
E
 8 (Access a host through executing code on the m
achine):0
7:R
U
L
E
 12 (password sniffing):0
2:R
U
L
E
 0 (W
hen a principal is com
prom
ised any m
achine he has an account on will also be com
prom
ised):0
3:canA
ccessH
ost(citrixServer_2):0
5:hasA
ccount(victim
_2_2,citrixServer_2,user):1
8:R
U
L
E
 3 (rem
ote exploit for a client program
):0
6:principalC
om
prom
ised(victim
_2_2):0
9:accessM
aliciousInput(citrixServer_2,victim
_2_2,ie):0
10:R
U
L
E
 22 (Browsing a m
alicious website):0
11:attackerL
ocated(internet):1
24:R
U
L
E
 22 (Browsing a m
alicious website):0
44:R
U
L
E
 6 (direct network access):0
57:R
U
LE 22 (Browsing a m
alicious website):0
70:R
U
L
E
 22 (Browsing a m
alicious website):0
89:R
U
LE 22 (Browsing a m
alicious website):0
12:hacl(citrixServer_2,internet,httpProtocol,httpPort):1
13:inC
om
petent(victim
_2_2):1
14:vulE
xists(citrixServer_2,’N2-2010-0490’,ie,rem
oteClient,privEscalation):1
15:execC
ode(com
m
Server_2,user):0
18:R
U
L
E
 8 (Access a host through executing code on the m
achine):0
21:R
U
L
E
 12 (password sniffing):0
31:R
U
L
E
 5 (m
ulti-hop access):0
16:R
U
L
E
 0 (W
hen a principal is com
prom
ised any m
achine he has an account on will also be com
prom
ised):0
17:canA
ccessH
ost(com
m
Server_2):0
19:hasA
ccount(victim
_2_1,com
m
Server_2,user):1
22:R
U
L
E
 3 (rem
ote exploit for a client program
):0
20:principalC
om
prom
ised(victim
_2_1):0
23:accessM
aliciousInput(com
m
Server_2,victim
_2_1,windows_2000):0
25:hacl(com
m
Server_2,internet,httpProtocol,httpPort):1
26:inC
om
petent(victim
_2_1):1
27:vulE
xists(com
m
Server_2,’N2-2010-0483’,windows_2000,rem
oteClient,privEscalation):128:execC
ode(dataHistorian_2,root):0
29:R
U
L
E
 2 (rem
ote exploit of a server program
):0
30:netA
ccess(dataHistorian_2,httpProtocol,httpPort):0
32:hacl(com
m
Server_2,dataHistorian_2,httpProtocol,httpPort):1
33:netw
orkServiceInfo(dataHistorian_2,m
ountd,httpProtocol,httpPort,root):1
34:vulE
xists(dataHistorian_2,’N2-2010-0494’,m
ountd,rem
oteExploit,privEscalation):1
35:execC
ode(m
ailServer_1,root):0
36:R
U
LE 4 (Trojan horse installation):0
37:accessFile(m
ailServer_1,write,’/export’):0
38:R
U
LE 17 (NFS shell):0
39:hacl(webServer_1,m
ailServer_1,nfsProtocol,nfsPort):1
40:nfsE
xportInfo(m
ailServer_1,’/export’,write,webServer_1):1
41:execC
ode(webServer_1,apache):0
42:R
U
L
E
 2 (rem
ote exploit of a server program
):0
43:netA
ccess(webServer_1,tcp,80):0
45:hacl(internet,webServer_1,tcp,80):1
46:netw
orkServiceInfo(webServer_1,httpd,tcp,80,apache):1
47:vulE
xists(webServer_1,’N1-2002-0392’,httpd,rem
oteExploit,privEscalation):1
48:execC
ode(subnet_1_1,user):0
51:R
U
L
E
 8 (Access a host through executing code on the m
achine):0
54:R
U
LE 12 (password sniffing):0
49:R
U
L
E
 0 (W
hen a principal is com
prom
ised any m
achine he has an account on will also be com
prom
ised):0
50:canA
ccessH
ost(subnet_1_1):0
52:hasA
ccount(victim
_1_1,subnet_1_1,user):1
55:R
U
LE 3 (rem
ote exploit for a client program
):0
53:principalC
om
prom
ised(victim
_1_1):0
56:accessM
aliciousInput(subnet_1_1,victim
_1_1,windows_2000):0
58:hacl(subnet_1_1,internet,httpProtocol,httpPort):1
59:inC
om
petent(victim
_1_1):1
60:vulE
xists(subnet_1_1,’N1-2010-0483’,windows_2000,rem
oteClient,privEscalation):1
61:execC
ode(subnet_1_2,user):0
64:R
U
L
E
 8 (Access a host through executing code on the m
achine):0
67:R
U
LE 12 (password sniffing):0
62:R
U
L
E
 0 (W
hen a principal is com
prom
ised any m
achine he has an account on will also be com
prom
ised):0
63:canA
ccessH
ost(subnet_1_2):0
65:hasA
ccount(victim
_1_2,subnet_1_2,user):1
68:R
U
LE 3 (rem
ote exploit for a client program
):0
66:principalC
om
prom
ised(victim
_1_2):0
69:accessM
aliciousInput(subnet_1_2,victim
_1_2,ie):0
71:hacl(subnet_1_2,internet,httpProtocol,httpPort):1
72:inC
om
petent(victim
_1_2):1
73:vulE
xists(subnet_1_2,’N1-2010-0490’,ie,rem
oteClient,privEscalation):1
74:execC
ode(workStation_1,root):0
75:R
U
LE 4 (Trojan horse installation):0
76:accessFile(workStation_1,write,’/export’):0
77:R
U
L
E
 17 (NFS shell):0
78:hacl(fileServer_1,workStation_1,nfsProtocol,nfsPort):1
79:nfsExportInfo(workStation_1,’/export’,write,fileServer_1):1
80:execC
ode(fileServer_1,user):0
83:R
U
L
E
 8 (Access a host through executing code on the m
achine):0
86:R
U
LE 12 (password sniffing):0
81:R
U
L
E
 0 (W
hen a principal is com
prom
ised any m
achine he has an account on will also be com
prom
ised):0
82:canA
ccessH
ost(fileServer_1):0
84:hasA
ccount(victim
_1_3,fileServer_1,user):1
87:R
U
L
E
 3 (rem
ote exploit for a client program
):0
85:principalC
om
prom
ised(victim
_1_3):0
88:accessM
aliciousInput(fileServer_1,victim
_1_3,windows_2003_server):0
90:hacl(fileServer_1,internet,httpProtocol,httpPort):1
91:inC
om
petent(victim
_1_3):1
92:vulE
xists(fileServer_1,’N1-2010-0812’,windows_2003_server,rem
oteClient,privEscalation):1
Figure
C
.1:Initialattack
graph
netw
ork
3
74
